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The Wild Card in the Caribbean -
Cuba©
Michael Wallace Gordon*
Cuba is indeed the wild card in the Caribbean. It is the political and economic aberra-
tion in the hemisphere. The paradoxes of Cuban society are illustrated by a dialogue
between two girlfriends in Havana. One says to the other "I understand you dumped your
new boyfriend. Why? I thought he was nice."
The friend responds, "I did dump him. He lied to me. He told me he was a bellhop at
the new hotel in Varadero, but he is not. He is only a doctor.'
Bellhops at Varadero earn tips in dollars. A bellhop who receives $10 in" tips a day, or
perhaps $240 a month (plus a state salary), is wealthy compared to a doctor. The latter is
paid at most a state monthly salary of 400 pesos. That is worth, at the exchange rate of
about twenty to one, about 20 U.S. dollars. 1 Is it surprising that your bellhop in Varadero
may also be a doctor?2
Is an economy gone so astray capable of offering anything of value to the ongoing
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations? Is there any contribution
Cuba might make, other than openly displaying its failed economy that illustrates the trag-
ic consequences of pursuing non-market economy characteristics? It remains the only
nation in this hemisphere, and one of the few remaining in the world, that rejects free
trade. While Cuba is a candidate for increased foreign trade, and certainly for better for-
eign relations with the United States, there is not much benefit to welcoming the personal
participation of President Fidel Castro at the FTAA negotiating table. Mr. Castro will not
be at the table, but "the Cuban issue" will be there, as it has been at each of the two con-
cluded summits in Miami and Santiago.
The negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas are underway with thir-
ty-four participants. There are thirty-five nations in our long and narrow hemisphere. One
of our hemispheric family is not at the negotiating table. It has not asked to come and was
* Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law, University of Florida.
1. The Cuban Government has long maintained that the Cuban peso was worth slightly more than
one U.S. dollar. The free market rate exceeded 100 to the dollar in 1994, when the Castro govern-
ment was beginning to acknowledge that the economy was becoming dollarized, and by Decree
140 in 1993 depenalized possession of dollars. That action, plus opening some farmer's markets,
and allowing small private businesses to operate legally under Decree 141, helped reverse the
decline of the value of the peso. The free market rate at the beginning of 1999 was about 20 pesos
to the dollar.
2. It is more likely that the doctor is driving a cab, or working at some entrepreneurial activity other
than employment at a hotel. Hotel employees are assigned by the Cuban Government to the
hotel venture, and doctors would not be eligible. Having received a medical education at the gov-
ernment's expense, doctors must practice medicine where assigned. Professionals in general are
prohibited from taking advantage of the Decree which permitted operating small businesses.
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not invited. Indeed, the United States wants that country to stay away. This prodigal nation
of the hemisphere is of course our small and dissonant neighbor to the south - Cuba. Cuba
has been over the past three successive centuries the economic dependency of Spain, the
United States, and the USSR. Since the late 1980s it has been on its own. For a decade Cuba
has been an independent nation. But under nonmarket economic policies, disproved and
discarded in all the other nations of the hemisphere and in most of the world, Cuba has
not done well. It needs all the benefits it might gain from association with democratic,
market economies. Why is it not part of the FTAA negotiations and should it be?
The negotiations are to conclude a FTAA by 2005, at which time negotiators will have
created the world's largest, and most disparate, trading bloc among some 800 million
members of the human species, representing various languages, religions, work ethics,
political and economic compositions, and cultures. Were the United States to expect that
Cuba would be under new and democratic leadership in another six years when the FTAA
negotiations conclude, it might make sense to include Cuba now-at least as an observer.
But the United States administration must believe that its Cuban foreign policy will con-
tinue to be as unsuccessful as it has been for the past four decades; the administration
apparently believes that its efforts to dislodge Mr. Castro will remain a failure for the next
half-dozen years.
The absence of Cuba from the FTAA negotiations is less because the nation is the
pariah of the hemisphere than because of the tenacity and longevity of its leader, Fidel
Castro. He is the longest serving head-of-state in the hemisphere. In one sense it is because
of his longevity that he is unwanted. No one leads for forty years in a democratic govern-
ment that has free elections. Mr. Castro began his leadership when Dwight Eisenhower was
president. Eight successive U.S. Presidents have held that office, four from each party.
When United States foreign policy towards Cuba was formulated exclusively in
Washington, the conditions for eliminating the U.S. trade embargo and renewing relations
were threefold: (1) removing Cuban troops from Africa; (2) ending fomenting revolution
in Latin American nations; and (3) agreeing to discuss the expropriation issue. Cuban
troops are no longer in Africa, and the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967 effectively
ended serious prospects of Cuban-led revolution in most of Latin America. 3 With regard
to the expropriations, Mr. Castro is willing to discuss the issue of compensation for the
expropriations, but his conditions remain tied to the unrealistic and unlawful measure of
payments offered in the 1960s. 4 To the disadvantage of the United States, its foreign policy
towards Cuba for most of this decade has not been formulated exclusively in Washington.
For electoral reasons, the President has effectively deferred to certain Cuban-American
exile groups in Miami (and in New Jersey) that demand the removal of the Castro brothers
from governance. Does Cuban leadership currently cause any more U.S. diplomatic effort
3. There have been other revolutions, perhaps most notably that in Nicaragua in 1979. That revolu-
tion may have been inspired by the Cuban revolution, but it was not fomented by the Cuban
Government.
4. This is perhaps most recently affirmed in writing by the Cuban response to the U.S. Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, better known as Helms-Burton, of 1996. Cuba
responded with the Ley de Reafirmaci6n de la Dignidad y Soberania Cubana (Ley No. 80), Dec.
24, 1996, which affirms the appropriateness of the compensation proposals made in the 1960s.
Those proposals clearly fell short of any international law norms of compensation.
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to confront than that of Colombia, where so much of the U.S. drug traffic commences, and
where U.S. "certification" procedures are rejected? Or of Panama, where the words "banco"
and "lavanderia" often seem synonymous; or Brazil, where U.S.-backed IMF plans are
accepted, but rarely fulfilled; or Mexico, where government corruption retards develop-
ment; or perhaps even Canada, which persists in subsidizing softwood lumber exports and
blocking magazine imports for questionably legitimate reasons of protecting Canadian
culture? The only threat from Cuba is the impact from renewed surges of uncontrolled
migration. In addition, there exists the threat of the Juragua nuclear plant, if ever complet-
ed, which uses the best of Russian technology, thoroughly tested at Chernobyl. We have
indeed negotiated an agreement with Cuba to limit immigration, and the Juragua con-
struction appears to remain dormant.5
The degree to which Cuba participates in the FTAA negotiations is a political question
rather than a legal one. Political goals are often the motivation for imposing legal trade
controls. The current goal is to remove Castro from office. The United States has tried for
nearly forty years. It started long before Bill Gates knew how to spell monopoly, before
Toyotas and Datsuns roamed the West, and even before Dallas was known as a city rather
than a sit-com. The Greeks gave up after laying siege to Troy for ten years and tried anoth-
er way. If ousting Castro is our crusade, we have forty-three years to go before we match
the duration of the European crusades to rid the Holy Land of Muslims. But surely Castro
will not survive that lengthy period. He has lived so long, however, that in Florida they
recently debated the wisdom of holding the fortieth annual post-Castro Cuba conference.
If we held that conference today we might appropriately ask the question - why is Cuba
not part of the FTAA negotiations, and should it be?
The first question is rather easy to answer. Cuba was not invited. The second is more
difficult - whether Cuba should be present. The question is really should there be Cubans
at the negotiations, because the Cuban question will be present with or without the physi-
cal presence of any Cuban negotiators. Cuba will thus have at least a de facto participation
in these negotiations, just as there is a de facto trade relationship with Cuba, de facto
tourism from the United States to Cuba, and de facto diplomatic relations between the
United States and Cuba.6 These de facto relationships mask the reality. Indeed, the gap
between the reality of the de facto relations, and the public statements declaring no rela-
tions and affirming the embargo, is so great as to cause continual embarrassment between
the United States and numerous third nations.
Cuba's denial of a formal role in the FTAA negotiations raises no legal issues of signifi-
cance, although Cuba's exclusion has an impact on the development of laws relating to
5. I drove by the site in March, 1998, and there was no sign of work in progress. The Libertad Act
illustrates the U.S. concern regarding the Juragua construction. Section 111 is entitled
"Withholding of Foreign Assistance from Countries Supporting Juragua Nuclear Plant in Cuba."
Eleven findings in the provision address the development of the facility, specific concerns of
nuclear experts, and potential danger to the United States. The law then withholds any U.S. assis-
tance to countries that support the completion of the plant. 22 U.S.C. § 6041 (1998).
6. The absence of formal diplomatic relations was "in part" the reason for Cuba's absence, according
to Uruguayan Ambassador to Canada Albio Rosselli. 12 BNA Int'l Trade Rep. 1641 (Oct. 4, 1995).
Since relations are extensive, albeit de facto, this reasoning seems weak. Ambassador Rosselli did
not state the "other" part of the reason for Mr. Castro's failure to be invited.
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trade in this hemisphere. We trade with all the other nations of the hemisphere because
they have varying degrees of democratically elected governments; although, the United
Nations and the United States have been called upon on several occasions during the past
decade to monitor elections in several of these nations because of convincing evidence of
routine election fraud in previous elections. But to the United States administration,
fraudulent elections are better than none at all. If Cuba would have some fraudulent elec-
tions that the United States could monitor, perhaps all would be well. The United States
just wants a little de facto democracy. The appearance rather than the reality is the founda-
tion of our foreign policy.
The United States has extensive relations of diplomacy, but not diplomatic relations,
with Cuba. On the Malecon in Havana-the beautiful drive along the Gulf Stream that runs
westward from the entrance to the Harbour at Old Havana-rises a refurbished stone-faced
building providing offices to the largest collection of foreign persons trained in diplomacy
from a single nation in Cuba. It is officially the Swiss Embassy. Probably not many Cubans
know the building as that. They know it as the U.S. embassy, but it is not really an embassy.
It is the U.S. "Interests" Section. Thirty plus U.S. citizens, and additional Cubans, work in
this building and do exactly what diplomats do in embassies in other nations. 7 President
Carter (some of you may be old enough to remember him) reestablished relations with
Cuba in 1977 on a limited basis. That means the person who heads the Interests Section is
not called "Mr. Ambassador,' although he has that rank in the foreign service. The past few
American heads of the Interests Section have tended to be persons of exceptional skill and
experience in the U.S. diplomatic service. The head of the Interests Section does not have a
flag on his car, but he does live in the same residence that served American ambassadors in
the pre-Castro era. Additionally, American flags are not flown from the office building or
the residence. But Cubans know what these buildings are. The head of the Interests Section
has never presented his credentials to Castro, but he speaks with him and has dined with
him, even at a state dinner.
The United States maintains this de facto recognition of the Castro Government
because it believes it to be in the country's best interest. After all, important dialogues
remain to maintain issues of immigration, occasional problems with the naval base at
Guantanamo, assistance to the many U.S. visitors to Cuba, and U.S. trade with Cuba.
I did say U.S. visitors to Cuba and trade with the United States. Many U.S. citizens
visit Cuba under license from the U.S. Government. Thousands of additional U.S. citizens
are estimated to travel to Cuba as tourists and business visitors without a license, by way of
the Bahamas, Canada, and Mexico.8 United States visitors are often surprised to find so
many U.S. goods used by Cubans and available for sale in Cuban dollar stores. It is because
of the substantial trade between the United States and Cuba - de facto trade. While the
7. These services include a useful web site: The United States and Cuba (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
<http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba>.
8. An estimated 18,000 illegal visits were made in 1998. See ST. AUGUSTINE RECORD, Nov. 8, 1998, at
8C. This article, under a Washington Post byline, listed Canadian tourist firms catering to
Americans, including telephone numbers. It also gave telephone numbers of Havana hotels.
Cuban immigration officials agree not to stamp U.S. passports to avoid informing U.S. customs
agents of the visit to Cuba upon the person's return to the United States.
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Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 9 the Cuban Democracy Act,' 0 and the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad or Helms-Burton act), l I severely restrict formal
trade, United States goods are present and for sale in Cuba in greater quantity and variety
than the goods of most nations that have formal trading relations. Soft drinks, candy, ciga-
rettes, wine, and liquor from the United States are readily available in dollar stores and
hotels throughout Cuba. Chrysler minivans are used as taxis. Trade with Cuba is prohibit-
ed; the sale of U.S. goods in Cuba is not. Canada, Mexico, and Panama are major conduits
for imports from the United States, bought by middlemen in those nations and resold to
Cuba. 12 The lowering of tariffs for trade between the United States and Canada, and the
United States and Mexico, has made Cuba a third party beneficiary of the NAFTA.
If the reality is that there are relations and trade with Cuba by the United States,
should the reality be some role for Cuba at the FTAA table? After all, Cuba has diplomatic
relations and trades with almost all other nations of the Western Hemisphere. Perhaps
Cuba should be allowed to participate as an observer? The "Cuban issue" will continue to
influence discussions. Prospective FTAA parties are very unlikely to allow some of the pro-
visions that were included in the NAFTA at the U.S. insistence to be part of the new agree-
ment. For example, Article 309(3) of the NAFTA states:
In the event that a Party adopts or maintains a prohibition or restriction on
the importation from or exportation to a non-Party of a good, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the Party from ... limiting or pro-
hibiting the importation from the territory of another Party of such good of
that non-Party.
Will FTAA parties accept that affirmation of a boycott? Perhaps they will. But in view
of the perception from abroad that the U.S. boycott of Cuba has led to the unreasonable, if
not unlawful, coercion of third nations to join the boycott, perhaps the following language
will be insisted upon by other nations:
Parties shall be prohibited from imposing upon any other party any actions
which are intended to require the other party to comply with, further or sup-
port any boycott fostered or imposed by the party against a country which is
friendly to the other party.
9. See31 C.F.R. § 515.101 (1999).
10. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2315
(1992).
11. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat.
785 (1996).
12. I asked the maitre d' in the Hotel Nacional how he was able to maintain such a wide selection of
California wines. He expressed surprise, indicating that they were easily available by way of
Mexico.
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If these words appear familiar it is because they are adapted from the U.S. antiboycott
provisions of the Export Administration Act (EAA). 13 The EAA boycott provisions were
adopted to prevent the Arab nations from gaining assistance from U.S. persons in the sup-
port or furtherance of the Arab boycott against Israel. The FTAA negotiators may be
observant of any attempts of the United States to preserve or extend its tendency to apply
U.S. laws extraterritorially. They may further wish to clarify that the national security
threat exception, certain to be included, does not allow self-determination of the justifica-
tion of that defense when the issue is clearly economic. 14
At the First Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in December 1994, the thirty-four
nations agreed to negotiate a FTAA by 2005.15 Some "concrete progress" was expected by
2000. The trade ministers from the thirty-four nations met in Denver the following year to
commence work and issued a joint declaration outlining an initial work program. 16 The
13. The boycott provisions state that:
"The President shall issue regulations prohibiting any United States person...
From taking or knowingly agreeing to take any of the following actions with
intent to comply with, further, or support any boycott fostered or imposed by a
foreign country against a country which is friendly to the United States...
Export Administration Act, 50 App. U.S.C. § 2407(a)( 1) (1998).
14. The national security exception in the NAFTA states:
Subject to Articles 607 (Energy-National Security Measures) and 1018 (Government
Procurement-Exceptions), nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(b) to prevent any Party from taking any action that it considers necessary for the protection
of its essential security interests
(ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, ...
North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA], art. 2102.
See Michael Wallace Gordon, The Conflict of United States Sanctions Laws with Obligations under
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1259 (1998).
15. See Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11, 1994, 34
I.L.M. 808. The working groups are 14 BNA Int'l Trade Reporter 481 (March 12, 1997). The Plan
of Action adopted at the Miami Summit included four sections: (1) Preserving and
Strengthening the Community of Democracies of the Americas, (2) Promoting Prosperity
Through Economic Integration and Free Trade, (3) Eradicating Poverty and Discrimination in
Our Hemisphere, and (4) Guaranteeing Sustainable Development and Conserving our Natural
Environment for Future Generations. See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the
FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal Accession, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 539 (1995); Craig L. Jackson, The Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas and Legal Harmonization, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INT'L LAW
NEWSLE'TER (1996).
16. Final Joint Declaration, Summit of the Americas Trade Ministerial, Denver, Colorado, June 30,
1995, 1996 BDIEL AD LEXIS 23. There were three invited observers, representatives from the
OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the U.N. Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Working groups were given guidelines to address
issues of (1) market access; (2) customs procedures and rules of origin; (3) investment; (4) stan-
dards and technical barriers to trade; (5) sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures; (6) subsi-
dies, antidumping and countervailing duties; and (7) smaller economies. The March 1996 Trade
Ministerial meeting would establish additional working groups for (8) government procurement;
(9) intellectual property rights; (10) services; and (11) competition policy.
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declaration made no mention of the non-participant, Cuba. 17 But, several of the working
groups did address subjects that may raise the "Cuban issue.' Subject one is dispute resolu-
tion. If sanctions are discussed, provisions of the United States-Cuban boycott laws that
many nations believe unlawfully attempt to interfere with trading with or investing in
Cuba, may be discussed. There is a working group on smaller economies, which was asked
to pinpoint and explore ways to help the adjustment of the smaller economies to the FTAA
process. One can hardly question that Cuba is most in need of assistance in making adjust-
ments to join the FTAA, and perhaps Cuba's presence as an observer would accelerate the
process of change. The Miami Summit Declaration speaks of "strengthening democracy,"
but not to the establishment of democracy.18 Would not assisting Cuba in the transitional
phase from socialism to democracy be at least as laudable as, for example, strengthening
the fledgling democracies that exist in so many of the Latin American nations?
A second Ministerial meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, in March, 1996, furthered
plans for the Second Summit in Santiago, Chile. As in Denver, the representatives identi-
fied some areas where there are considerable differences, from conceptual, such as whether
the FTAA should look more like the NAFTA or more like the MERCOSUR, to technical,
such as governing standards, and to social, such as the role of worker's rights in the FTAA.
It would have been good for Cuba to listen to these discussions, and to learn the intensity
of desire to further develop these many market economies.1 9
At the Santiago Second Summit in April of 1998,20 the United States' role had weak-
ened since the Miami Summit, due to otherwise-preoccupied President Clinton's inability
to gain "fast-track" negotiating authority from a Congress whose membership has listened
to considerable public opposition to new trade agreements. 21 Cuba was not present at this
summit, but once again the Cuban question was present. Canadian Prime Minister Jean
Chretien said at the meeting that "Cuba should be here." 22 President Alberto Fujimora of
17. Cuba was, nevertheless, a major topic of conversation among delegates. See Sibylla Brodzinsky,
Cuba overtakes trade, education and drugs at Americas summit talks, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr.
19, 1998.
18. Lack of a democratic government has been often mentioned by hemispheric leaders as the reason
for Cuba's absence. For example, Uruguay's Ambassador to Canada, Albio Rosselli, stated at an
Ottawa seminar that the Latin American participants at the Miami Summit effectively made a
statement that the FTAA ought to include only countries with democratic systems in place. 12
BNA Int'l Trade Rep. 1641 (October 4,1995).
19. A third Ministerial meeting was convened in San Jose, Costa Rica, on March 19, 1998, to under-
take some final work before the Santiago Summit, then only a month away.
20. The Summit drew 22 presidents, and prime ministers or premiers of 12 other nations.
21. Another blow to the United States in April was the refusal of a number of Latin American
nations to condemn Cuba for human rights violations at a meeting of the U.N. Human Rights
Commission in Geneva, where a U.S.-sponsored condemnation of Cuba was voted down. John
Rice, The U.S. is Almost Alone in Trying to Isolate Cuba, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 2,1998.
22. Jose Zambrano, Americas: Cuba, Absent Protagonist at OAS Assembly, INTER PRESS SERVICE, May
28, 1998. Prime Minister Chretien visited Cuba after the meeting. But Mr. Chretien has not hesi-
tated to criticize Cuba's human rights record, raising it during his visit with Mr. Castro.
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Peru agreed, stating it was unfair to exclude Cuba from the Summit, adding that Cuba was
no longer a threat to any nation. 23 Brazil's President Fernando Henrique Cardosa referred
to Cuba as "the great absentee:' and suggested Cuba's presence was essential for the group
to be able to say that "our America is one.' 24 All the comments about Cuba were not so
generous. Brazilian President Cardosa and Chilean Foreign Minister Miguel Insulza criti-
cized Cuba's record on human rights and lack of political pluralism, although they
believed more was to be accomplished by engagement than isolation.25 The increasing
sympathy for some Cuban presence may again be raised prior to the Third Summit,
planned for Canada in 2001. Canada had initiated discussions of the Cuban issue infor-
mally, although the final documents included no references to the issue. Political pressures
in Canada may make Cuba a major issue prior to the 2001 summit.
The Second Summit in Santiago offered participants an opportunity to raise a sepa-
rate issue: Cuba's exclusion from the Organization of American States (OAS), which dates
to 1962, when Cuba was expelled because the Cuban Government was "incompatible with
the principles and objectives of the Interamerican system' 26 and when all the hemispheric
nations except Canada and Mexico began to break diplomatic relations. By now, nearly all
of the nations of the hemisphere have restored some form of diplomatic relations with
Cuba, in a few instances limited to interests sections much like the United States. 27 A num-
ber of the diplomatic relations restorations have occurred recently, such as that of the
Dominican Republic and Guatemala in 1998.28 Many of the nations appear ready to
accept Cuba back into the OAS. But not the United States.29
The increasing hemispheric receptiveness to Cuba's readmission to the OAS has not
been well received by the United States. The United States' attitude has been clearly
expressed-until Cuba is a democracy, there is no room at the table, indeed there is no
23. Ved Nanda, End U.S. Embargo on Cuba, DENVER PosT, May 4, 1998.
24. LATIN AMERICAN WEEKLY REPORT, May 5, 1998, at 192. His comments offered some hint that the
FTAA might be willing to accept a non-market economy regime, a view not often openly dis-
cussed. Gazeta Mercantil, Rio de Janeiro, April 27, 1998.
25. President Cardosa hoped that Cuba would take the indispensable "steps towards democracy."
Gazeta Mercantil, Apr. 27, 1998.
26. Also of concern was Cuba's military alliance with the USSR. The collapse of the USSR has elimi-
nated this concern, but the incompatibility of the Cuban Government with the Interamerican
system persists. In 1991, after the USSR had withdrawn considerable support to Cuba, the OAS
reaffirmed its commitment to democracy in the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the
Renewal of the Inter-American System. OAS Resolution No. 1080. The motivation was the dis-
ruption to democracy occurring in several OAS nations, especially Guatemala, Haiti, and Peru.
27. Cuba has trade relations with some 135 nations, and more than 150 foreign companies have
established offices in Havana. Steven Girardi, Cuban Diplomat Speaks in Favor of Ending "Cold
War Mentality," TAMPA TRIBUNE, May 28, 1998, at 11.
28. The Honduran Congress urged the president to restore relations in late 1998. Reuters Ltd., Oct. 8,
1998, Cuba Net (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.cubanet.org/CNews>.
29. U.S. Ambassador to the OAS Victor Marrero spoke at length in opposition to Mexico's proposal
for readmission of Cuba. See U.S. Information Agency Int'l web site (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
<http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/CUI >.
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room anywhere in the room, for the Castro Government. 30 But other nations reject the
United States' position. Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy called for
Cuba's reintegration during the March, 1998, OAS Conference on the Americas. 31 Prime
Minister Chretien has stated Cuba ought to be readmitted. 32 Venezuela and Chile have also
expressed similar views.33 At the very brief June, 1998, 28th General Assembly of the OAS
in Caracas, Venezuela, the United States blocked debate on Cuba's readmission, after
Mexico placed the matter before the meeting.34 The Secretary General, Chilean Alviro
Gaviria, stated that Cuba was the "most important political problem to be solved in the
hemisphere," but the meeting did little to assist Cuba's return to the democratic fold. There
was a second recent rejection of the U.S. Cuban policy. The opinion of the OAS Inter-
American Juridical Committee in August, 1996, which by an eleven to zero vote found
numerous international law violations in the U.S. Libertad Act, was not well received by
the United States. 35 Nor was the United States pleased with the 1996 OAS General
Assembly resolution criticizing U.S. legislation that allows challenges to third-nations
doing business with Cuba and using assets nationalized by Cuba, a direct reference to the
Libertad Act.36 The ineffectiveness of the OAS in dealing with Cuba was emphasized when
a Chilean government official at the Summit of the Americas in Santiago noted that the
Pope's visit to Cuba had done more to restore Cuba in the hemisphere than the OAS had
accomplished during the thirty-six years since Cuba's expulsion.
30. President Clinton stated he would not accept a democratic vote on the readmission of Cuba to
the OAS. One of his reasons was the fear that the fledgling democracies of Latin America might
be threatened by participation in an OAS which included non-democratic Cuba. INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Apr. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5986986.
31. Albright Signals FTAA's Importance for Cooperation in Hemisphere, 15 BNA Int'l Trade Rep. 426
(Mar. 11, 1998).
32. Ved Nanda, End U.S. Embargo on Cuba, DENVER POST, May 4, 1998, available in 1998 WL
6109976.
33. Venezuela Backs Cuba in Joining Regional Blocs, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE, Apr. 25, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 2808421.
34. Mexico had proposed a task force to study how Cuba's isolation might be ended. Estrella
Gutierrez, The Ball is now in Cuba's court, says OAS, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 4, 1998, available in
1998 WL 5987577. Apparently, Cuba had not formally asked to return, which might have pre-
sented a different issue. The United States was irritated at the forceful manner in which Mexico
presented the matter at the meeting, proposing readmission rather than a discussion of the
issues. There was really no reason for the issue to arise because Cuba had not made a formal
request for readmission, required under OAS procedures. The U.S. rejection of Cuba's readmis-
sion was unsupported by a majority of the other governments, but no decision was made. The
end result was another blow to U.S. prestige, as it showed its determination to be the superpower
in the hemisphere and act unilaterally even with very considerable opposition from other hemi-
spheric.nations.
35. Organization of the American States: Inter-American Juridical Committee Examining the U.S.
Helms-Burton Act, Aug. 27, 1996, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1322 (1996). The opinion is nonbinding.
Included among the eleven votes was that of the U.S. member of the Committee, Keith Highet, a
highly respected international lawyer.
36. OAS Resolution on Free Trade and Investment in the Hemisphere, June 4, 1996, OAS Doc.
OEA/SER.P AG/doc.3375/96.
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At the CARIFORUM summit, a meeting of sixteen heads of state of Caribbean
nations, in August of 1998, Castro was an invited observer; his invitation was the result of a
decision of the European Union Council of Ministers. 37 A group of the African,
Caribbean, and Pacific former colonies had suggested Cuban participation to the
European Union, since the CARIFORUM summit was scheduled principally to discuss
forthcoming negotiations for a new Lom6 Convention to replace Lom6 4, which expires in
2000.38 Cuba came away from the August meeting a full member of CARIFORUM and an
observer at the September negotiations for the replacement of Lom6 4. Full Cuban mem-
bership to the Lom6 group, however, will only be granted with a better human rights
record and improved management of the economy.39
The Caribbean nations have been especially receptive to Castro's participation in
trade negotiations. He visited Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Granada, and
Jamaica prior to the August CARIFORUM meeting. 40 During that meeting, Surinam
President Jules Widdenbosch, speaking on behalf of the CARICOM (Caribbean
Community and Common Market), asked the Caribbean nations to accept Cuba as a
member of CARICOM with full rights. 4 1 Cuba's integration into CARICOM would
undoubtedly occur, but for the threats from Washington to end economic aid to the
nations supporting Cuba. But as U.S. aid to the Caribbean diminishes, 42 such threats
37. The Cuban Press reported on an interview with Dominican Republic President Leonel
Fernandez at this first CARIFORUM summit. President Fernandez reportedly had urged
Cuba's admission because Cuba was important as part of the "Caribbean family." Dominican
President on Regional Integration, Ties with Cuba, Cuba Vision, Havana, Sept. 1, 1998; See
also, Caribbean Forum Ends Meeting on Promoting Integration, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Havana, Aug. 22, 1998.
38. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 15, 1998, AL/D3306/L (from Notimex News Agency,
Mexico City).
39. Cuba Becomes Observer of ACP, but membership Depends on Human Rights, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, June 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2312286.
40. Visits to Cuba have been made in the past year by leaders of such Caribbean nations as the
Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent. Chris Hawley,
Cuba woos Caribbean Neighbors with Hope of Tying Economic Knot, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 2,
1998, available in 1998 WL 16763029.
41. CARICOM is composed of 15 members, comprising all the members of the CARIFORUM
except Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Since the withdrawal of USSR assistance, Cuban
bilateral trade with CARICOM members has risen from $6 million to $70 million. 11 World
Magazine No. 9 (Sept. 1, 1998). Membership in CARICOM might open the EU's markets,
especially sugar, to Cuba. ACP members (the Lom6 countries) are given special preferences
for commodity exports to the EU. In November 1998, CARICOM agreed to create a prefer-
ential trade area between the member countries and Cuba. Gary G. Yerkey, Caribbean
Nations Move to Conclude Preferential Trade Agreement with Cuba, 15 BNA Int'l Trade Rep.
2005 (Dec. 2, 1998).
42. A decade ago the United States provided about $200 million annual aid to the Caribbean; it is
now closer to $25 million. Yana Marull, Castro Arrives in Dominican Republic Amid Tight Security,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16582325.
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are less significant.4 3 These nations are especially upset with the United States for fail-
ing to grant NAFTA parity for Caribbean exports to the United States.
The LAIA or ALADI (Latin American Integration Association), was formed in 1980 to
develop trade and establish trade preference and integration agreements. 44 There are
eleven members with intra-regional trade of some $44 billion.4 5 Cuba, which has trade
and economic agreements with some of the members, became an observer in 1986 and
submitted a formal request for full membership in March, 1998. Because membership is
based solely on economic rather than political grounds (i.e., there is no democracy clause),
full membership was granted at the group's summit in November, 1998.46 The admission
had the support of a consensus, including the more conservative nations of the hemi-
sphere, such as Chile, which had signed a trade accord with Cuba in August.47
Although a minor economic integration of Cuba into Western Hemispheric organiza-
tions is occurring, major participation would be having some presence at the FTAA nego-
tiations. Little possibility exists that Cuba will be allowed as a formal party. What might
Cuba add to or detract from the FTAA negotiations as an observer, if formal participation
is not acceptable?
While the foundations of the U.S. boycott of Cuba appear increasingly tenuous, the
participation of Castro in any event that has a table and a podium is troubling. Castro's
comments during his visit to the Dominican Republic for the summit meeting of CARI-
COM confirm such concern. Castro called for an alliance of the Caribbean, Central, and
South American nations against the United States, which he compared to an elephant that
Latin America needs to fight like a bull.48 Earlier in the same month, Castro had spoken in
Jamaica in terse words about Latin America. He reminded his hosts that only Mexico had
not broken relations with Cuba in the 1960s,49 criticized Latin American health and edu-
cation systems, blamed them for allowing the United States to have such disproportionate
power in the hemisphere, and suggested that if Latin America had followed Cuba rather
43. One group opposing admission of Cuba to CARICOM are the Caribbean journalists, who at a
May 1998, conference voted to oppose such admission unless Cuba reduced its control over the
news media.
44. ALADI was created by the Treaty of Montevideo to succeed the ALALC, the Latin American Free
Trade Association, established by an earlier treaty of Montevideo in 1960.
45. Latin American Weekly Report, pg. 198 (May 5, 1998). Members are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
46. Cuba Becomes Member of Latin American Trade Group, 15 BNA Int'l Trade Rep. 1891 (Nov. 11,
1998). Cuba became entitled to trade benefits under the ALADI regional tariff preference system.
47. Chile exported $17 million worth of goods to Cuba in 1997. Gustavo Gonzalez, Chile Broadens its
Economic Ties with Rest of Region, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL
5988865.
48. Dalia Acosta, Castro Calls for Alliance Against United States, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 24, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 5988928.
49. Mr. Castro nevertheless a few months later managed to also alienate Mexico by his comments
that more Mexican children know about Mickey Mouse than their own national heroes. N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1998, at A5.
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than the United States, it would be a better place. 50 If these kinds of comments are a reflec-
tion of how he might use participation at the FTAA negotiating sessions, the FTAA does
not need him. However beneficial it might be for him to hear and witness the proceedings,
the concern would be for when he speaks. It is likely that given an opportunity to speak, he
would continue to try to leverage the nations of Latin America against the United States,
such as his criticism about the U.S. assistance to Central and South American nations in
support of the WTO petition regarding European Union limits on bananas. 51
While Castro's participation would predictably be disruptive, the participation of
many of Cuba's younger, mid-level ministry officials could be constructive. Most of those I
have met are closet reformists, waiting for the day when Cuba moves much more towards a
market economy. Participation by observing might well push Cuba towards democracy
and a market economy. But only if they were able to participate without Castro present to
engage in his commonly disruptive rages.
In reality, perhaps all this concern about Cuba and the FTAA is irrelevant. Is Cuba
anything more than a de minimus entity in the Western Hemisphere's economic commu-
nity?52 Cuban trade in the Western Hemisphere was relatively negligible while Cuba was
an USSR dependency. The collapse caused a drop in trade of as much as seventy-five per-
cent, and economic output fell about fifty percent.53 But Cuban exports have increasingly
found markets in this hemisphere.54 Before the collapse, most of Cuba's trade was with the
USSR and Eastern Europe. Now some fifty percent is with Europe (mostly Western
Europe), about twenty-five percent with Canada and Latin America, 55 and about twenty
percent with Asia.56 Some forty-nine percent of Cuba's imports come from the hemi-
sphere, partly from the United States by way of third nations such as Canada, Mexico, and
50. Michelle Faul, Castro Aims Wrath at Latin America, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, Aug. 2, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 3620347. On his next stop in the Barbados, he criticized the U.S. WTO chal-
lenge to the EU banana preferences, suggesting that the beneficiaries were large U.S. companies.
Id.
51. Id.
52. Cuba would only add some 11 million persons to the 800 million in the 34 participating nations.
53. M2 COMMUNICATIONS PRESS WIRE, Sept. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16524295.
54. New trade agreements are announced frequently, further illustrating refusal to follow the U.S.
demands for reducing trade with Cuba. See, e.g., Foreign Affairs Minister to Visit Cuba to Discuss
FTAA, Gazeta Mercantil Investment News, Rio de Janeiro, May 12, 1998 (announcing Brazilian
negotiations with Cuba for sales of Brazilian food for Cuban medicines, and Brazilian oil-drilling
in Cuban waters); Gustavo Gonzalez, Chile Broadens its Economic Ties with Rest of Region, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5988865 (announcing new trade agreement
with Cuba); Trinidad and Tobago Seeks Trade Relations with Cuba, INT'L MARKET INSIGHTS
REPORT, Aug. 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13711703 (noting proposed investment protection
and promotion agreement with Cuba).
55. Canada is Cuba's major trading partner, followed by Spain, China, France, and Mexico. Central
American Exports up 38%, MEXICO BUSINESS MONTHLY, Aug. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL
17145306 (reporting Mexico's joining the top five trading partners of Cuba).
56. Id. In addition to exports, tourism is an important source of revenue. Canada, Colombia, and
Mexico are among the leading sources of tourists.
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Panama.57 Cuba is producing at a pace far below its potential, which means trade with
Latin America will increase regardless of the U.S. boycott.58 Latin American nations thus
view Cuba as logically included in any trade discussions in the hemisphere. But until Cuba
takes some steps, perhaps granting some clear freedoms, there is unlikely to be a major
Latin American movement to bring Cuba into hemispheric organizations, especially the
OAS. That may be as much for fear of economic retribution from the United States as for
any true feeling that democracy in situ is a precondition to readmission. The steps required
by the United States are considerably more extensive. They are expressed by, and locked
into, the Libertad Act.59
The FTAA will proceed without Cuba as a participant or observer until changes
occur in Cuba. That may be soon, or it may be after the conclusion of a FTAA in another
few years. At some time Cuba will be given the opportunity to join. Cuba's current non-
market economy characteristics make it an inappropriate formal participant in the nego-
tiations. The FTAA parties are not prepared to allow a non-market economy to join by
establishing the kind of special status that the members of the GATT did by adding
Article XVII "State Trading Enterprises." The FTAA will be a market economy agreement
for market economy participation. While Cuba may be a nation in transition, that tran-
sitional status discloses that only a few very small steps have been taken. They are steps
that were allowed with reluctance by Castro, who remains mired in the ancient philoso-
phy of nations since converted. Cuba remains a nation of paradoxes, distant perhaps
from the Cuba of USSR dependency, but even more distant from the democratic and
market economy movements in this hemisphere. Cuba is a special case. To Castro, Cuba
is in what is called the "Special Period in Peacetime." It is a period of economic austerity,
with rationing of a central characteristic. Another dialogue of this special period, which
commenced in 1990, soon after the USSR withdrawal, and continues today, reaffirms
that Cuba is a wild card in the Caribbean.
57. These are not exports directly from the United States, nor transshipments with the knowledge of
the U.S. exporters. They are purchases in such nations as Canada, Mexico, and Panama by non-
U.S. citizens who resell them to Cuba. Unless U.S.exporters have reason to believe that the prod-
ucts are being resold to Cuba, they are not likely prospects for challenge by the U.S. authorities.
58. The U.S. has acknowledged that it is unable to prevent other nations from doing business in
Cuba, a clear failure of U.S. attempts to have other nations join the United States trade boycott.
The current position is to encourage Cuba's trading partners to engage in what the U.S. calls
"best business practices" They have not been defined, but would presumably include avoiding
using expropriated property in Cuba. See Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for
Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, Press Statement, July 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL
14096888.
59. Libertad Act at § 205.
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In conclusion, a short joke:
God has called the leaders of Russia, Cuba, and the United States together
and told them that the world will come to an end and go prepare their people.
Mr. Clinton calls the American people together and tells them he has good
news and bad news. The good news is that there is a God and we were right to
so believe. The bad news is that the world will come to an end in forty days.
Mr. Yeltsin calls the Russian people together and says there is bad news and
there is more bad news. The first bad news is that there really is a God, and we
were wrong. The other bad news is that the world will come to an end in forty
days. Mr. Castro calls the Cuban people together and tells them that there is
good news and more good news. The first good news is that the Cuban people
are among the most important people in the world because God chose to call
only the people of Cuba, Russia, and the United States together for important
news. The other good news is that the special period will end in forty days.
